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This article attempts to demonstrate the connections between US executive war powers, US 
interpretations of the international law on the use of force, and the history of US war-making 
and war-fighting, both at home and abroad. It begins by discussing the status of presidential 
war powers in the US domestic context, before examining the centrality of national security in 
US political life. In arguing that the imperial character of U.S. international legal interpretation 
and defence policy changes very little between Democratic and Republican administrations, 
regardless of the ‘legality’ of relevant actions subject to the international law on the use of 
force, this paper illustrates that U.S. ‘exceptionalism’ is situated not in a sphere outside the 
international rule of law, but rather in an exceptional space within an international legal system 
that privileges the powerful. 
INTRODUCTION 
The political literature on the United States is divided on the extent to which US foreign policy 
is impacted by the political party which holds the Presidency, and often co-exists with 
assumptions that Democratic Presidents are more supportive of multilateralism and upholding 
the rule of law.  As a small, officially neutral country, that supports an ordered, multilateral 
world system, and also one with close ties to the USA, the attitude of the US President to 
questions of the rule of law in international conflicts is of vital strategic importance to Ireland.  
It is the role of the USA in conflicts abroad which has been the most common source of friction 
in Ireland on American foreign policy, most recently seen in the protests and debate around the 
use of Shannon airport by the US military en route to Iraq.  This article examines the extent to 
which US military action abroad is a product of exceptional circumstances or particular 
presidents, or alternatively whether it is an integral part of the perceived, necessary, function 
of the US presidency, built into the core political and legal structure of the state.  
 
The United States has been involved in war continuously since the foundation of the state, to 
the extent that war is embedded in American culture to the point that it is a feature of everyday 
life.1 The set of founding beliefs which are an integral part of the American mythos, are both 
based on ‘universal’ ideas of ‘freedom, equality, justice and humanity’,2 and a high level of 
concern with militancy and national security, on which American exceptionalism is founded.3 
The global military supremacy that the United States enjoys – and is committed to perpetuating 
– has become so central to the state’s identity that the U.S. views itself  as an exceptional state, 
and believes it is also a state that can exempt itself from the international legal system and the 
rule of law.4  The US also frequently pays creative lip service to the interpretation of existing 
legal rules, even though it is willing to flout others.5 In acting in this way, U.S. ‘exceptionalism’ 
is situated not in a sphere outside the international rule of law, but rather in an exceptional 
space within an international legal system that privileges the powerful. The international legal 
system is not a level playing field, in which all states are ‘free’ and ‘equal’, and only the most 
powerful states – those with the biggest ‘markets’ and the largest reservoirs of resources – can 
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get away with resisting some of the rules they so rigorously enforce amongst their peers.6  
When ‘a strong state has influence over what the law says … [l]aw and power become 
entangled by this process…’ to the advantage of the powerful, and this is especially evident in 
the international law on the use of force. 7   
Political power is ‘a force that continuously informs the creation, interpretation and 
enforcement of international law’,8 yet ‘interpretative disputes and their outcomes’ are not 
presented as a ‘function of power but simply as a result of unclear texts that are a product of 
compromises arrived at during the course of international negotiations.’9 As a result, states 
usually act lawfully – because ‘a complete mismatch between the rules of international law and 
the interests and practices of powerful states is rare’, and ‘violation is not a frequent event.’10  
Demonstrating that in law, ‘all depends on politics’ does not mean that the political character 
of law cancels out law’s legal character. It emphasises that there will be an ‘inevitable moment 
of choice in legal practice in favour of one contested meaning against another’ and, typically, 
this choice favours the interests of the powerful.11 The politics of choosing between different 
legal interpretations can be seen in, for example, U.S. attempts to create a right of pre-emptive 
self-defence in international law, in establishing the category of ‘unlawful combatant,’ and in 
the naming of the tactic of ‘targeted killing’, as used  by Republican President George W. Bush 
and Democratic President Barack Obama in recent years.  
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In the US context, this tension between the interpretation of law and political power is most 
commonly debated in the context of the U.S. debate on the separation of powers.  It is relevant 
to ‘international legal practice on the use of force, because it influences U.S. practice and the 
United States plays an outsized role internationally with regard to the use of force’.12 The 
accumulation of war-making powers in the US Executive Branch has direct consequences for 
the creation of customary international law on the use of force, for the interpretation of treaty 
rules regarding the use of force, and the interpretation of rules governing any uses of that force, 
as there is very limited domestic oversight by either the US Courts or Congress.  It is therefore 
important to understand the division of war-making powers within the U.S. federal 
government, as this is ‘crucial for understanding how the United States conceptualizes and 
engages with international law on the use of force’ and, as the world’s most powerful military 
actor, the US therefore has a significant capacity to frame and influence international law on 
the use of force.13  
 
PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS IN THE UNITED STATES 
‘The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for this reason no 
constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is 
committed.’14 
In theory, war-making powers in the U.S. are divided between Congress and the Executive 
Branch, as the Executive Branch’s ability to approve the use of force is constrained by 
Congressional powers. Under the division of the war powers of the U.S. federal government 
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according to the U.S. Constitution, the President is the Commander in Chief of the armed 
forces, as is stipulated in Article II, but it is Congress that has the power to declare war, and to 
raise and support the armed forces, according to Article I.15 The difference in language between 
Article I and Article II means that Congressional powers are seen as ‘exhaustive’, with 
Congress not allowed to do more than enumerated, while the illustrated powers for the 
Executive Branch are seen as ‘illustrative’, ‘implying the existence of powers not specifically 
mentioned in the government’s written charter.  As a result, those who advocate for increased 
presidential war making rely on this distinction to justify such Presidential power.’16 There is 
substantial debate as to the exact scope of Executive Branch power as it relates to national 
security, given that the U.S. constitution contains only a limited discussion of and reference to 
those powers,17 and neither the term ‘national security’ nor ‘foreign affairs’ is used or referred 
to in the text of the constitution.18  
In the view of Gonzales (who acted as legal counsel to the Bush administration between 2001-
2005), from ‘a strict construction of the Constitution’s text… the President cannot declare war’, 
and ‘one can argue that the President has no authority (beyond acting in self-defense) to initiate 
force or engage in military operations unless authorized by Congress to do so’. However, war 
power roles have become ‘increasingly murky’ due to Congress’ ‘frequent reluctance and 
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failure to act’, the judiciary’s ‘inclination to demur’, and, according to Gonzales, the increasing 
number of severe threats ‘requiring decisive and rapid responses that only the President can 
provide.’19  This lack of clarity is based on the wording of the constitution, which, while stating 
that Congress has the power to declare war, does not state that military force can only be 
authorised or used in situations of war.20  
It has generally been agreed historically that the Executive Branch has the authority to respond 
in self-defence to an attack, and to take defensive measures in the face of an imminent threat.21  
To assume that these are the only circumstances in which a president may authorise the use of 
force today would be erroneous, but the extent to which presidents have a unilateral right to 
order the use of force is contentious. Haas identifies two major schools of thought regarding 
the subject of prerogative power and war powers. The first ‘suggests that the president 
rightfully retains war-making powers independent of strict legislative approval by way of 
inherent powers’, while the second argues that ‘the Constitution leaves much less discretion to 
the president in the execution of the war power.’ 22 
Some of the principal proponents of the first approach have included John Yoo, former deputy 
assistant attorney general in the Office of Legal Counsel during the George W. Bush 
administrations (and author of the ‘Torture memos’, which asserted that the Geneva 
Conventions were not applicable to the U.S. in the ‘war on terror’), and former Supreme Court 
Justice and Assistant Attorney General, William H. Rehnquist.23 Yoo has argued that ‘the 
Framers created a framework designed to encourage presidential initiative in war’, with the 
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constitution consciously designed to provide ‘elasticity’ in the war powers process.24 Rehnquist 
envisioned a ‘core of exclusive presidential commander in chief authority’, with Congress 
having the power ‘in certain situations to restrict the President’s power as Commander in Chief 
to a narrower scope than it would have had in the absence of regulations.’25 Ramsey, on the 
other hand, writes: ‘the original war powers design, as we are able to understand it today, is 
best described as a core of exclusive congressional power surrounded by an area of arguable 
independent presidential authority’, though this area of independent presidential authority is 
one which leaves the executive with ‘substantial plausible avenues to justify the independent 
use of force.’26 For example, an opinion from the White House’s Office of Legal Counsel 
(OLC) of 1970, written by Rehnquist to defend the lawfulness of President Nixon’s decision 
to deploy U.S. ground and air forces into Cambodia for the purpose of destroying base camps 
in use as supply depots and sanctuaries by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, offers a 
broader interpretation of executive war-making powers.27 In Rehnquist’s opinion, the 
Constitution accommodates two interests: ‘the prohibition of one-man commitment of a nation 
to war and the need for prompt executive response to international situations’, and that ‘in 
changing the original wording from the power of Congress to make war to the power of 
Congress to declare war’,  the “Founding Fathers” intended to distinguish between the 
initiation of armed conflict, which is for Congress to determine, and armed response to conflict 
situations, which the Executive may undertake.’28  
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Today, it is generally accepted that the President may also use military force without prior 
permission from Congress in the case of an emergency, in order to protect citizens or repel an 
invasion.29  Congress has used full Declarations of War only sparingly, and instead has tended 
to authorise the president to use military force for specific instances through a statute, an 
example of which is the 2001 AUMF authorising the use of force against those responsible for 
the 9/11 attacks.30 
As the United States became more powerful and increased its military reach, it established a 
‘large permanent military less dependent on the Congress to raise funds for action,’, and 
presidents and lawmakers began to interpret the prerogatives of the Commander-in-Chief more 
broadly.’ 31 Largely motivated by the United States’ involvement in the conflicts in Korea and 
Vietnam – ‘two long and unpopular wars’ – Congress ‘acted to reclaim its war-making 
authority’ from the President.32 Congress was largely unsuccessful in its attempts to rein in 
presidential power, although it did pass the War Powers Resolution (WPR) in 1973, over 
President Richard Nixon’s veto. 33 The WPR was intended to: 
‘insure that the collective judgment of both Congress and the president will apply to 
the introduction of United States into hostilities, or into situations where imminent 
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involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued 
use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.’34  
This resolution asserts that the constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief 
to introduce U.S. armed forces into hostilities are exercised only pursuant to a declaration of 
war, specific statutory authorization, or a national emergency created by attack upon the United 
States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.35  The majority view in Congress was 
that ‘flexibility has become a euphemism for presidential domination’ and the ‘nation’s ability 
to make decisive choices, they stressed, was not equivalent to the president’s ability to do so.’36  
Since Nixon, all U.S. presidents have ‘consistently taken the position that the War Powers 
Resolution is an unconstitutional infringement upon the power of the Executive Branch’.37 The 
Resolution has not been effective, and subsequent U.S. presidents have approved the use of 
military force without prior Congressional approval; the most recent example being President 
Trump’s assassination of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani in Iraq in January 2020.38 
U.S. courts ‘have not been willing to adjudicate challenges to purported presidential 
noncompliance with the War Powers Resolution.’39 While presidents can deploy troops for 
short-term interventions of less than sixty days (having notified Congress within the first 48 
hours of the deployment), under the WPR, these troops are supposed to return home to the U.S. 
 
34 H.J.Res 542 Public Law 93-148 Joint Resolution Concerning the war powers of Congress and the President 
(War Powers Resolution), available at: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20171130180346/https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-
87/pdf/STATUTE-87-Pg555.pdf (20 October 2020). 
35 HJ. Res 542 Public Law 93-148. 
36 Andrew Rudalevige, The New Imperial Presidency, 118. 
37 Library of Congress, ‘War Powers’ (2017) 
<https://web.archive.org/web/20171130174502/https://www.loc.gov/law/help/war-powers.php>, accessed 30th 
November 2018. 
38 BBC News, ‘Qasem Soleimani: US strike on Iran general was unlawful, UN expert says’, 09 July 2020, 
available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-53345885 (20 October 2020). See also: The New 
York Times, ‘U.S. strike in Iraq kills Qassim Suleimani, Commander of Iranian Forces’, 09 July 2020, available 
at:  https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/02/world/middleeast/qassem-soleimani-iraq-iran-attack.html (20 October 
2020). 
39 Curtis A. Bradley, International Law in the U.S. Legal System (Oxford and New York, 2015), 298. 
if Congressional approval has not been granted by the time the sixty-day mark has been 
reached. In practice, however, ‘presidents have used loopholes, saying that deployed troops are 
not involved in “hostilities”’40, and courts have ‘reasoned that the meaning of “hostilities” in 
the Resolution…is a nonjusticiable political question that must be worked out by Congress and 
the Executive Branch rather than the courts.’41  
The WPR also includes an obligation on presidents to submit a report to Congress ‘within 48 
hours of any introduction of armed forces into hostilities or conditions where hostilities are 
likely to occur, along with details of the reason(s), circumstances, and authorities relevant to 
his decision.’ Between 1973 and 2019, according to the War Powers Resolution Reporting 
Project, presidents submitted 48-hour reports under the WPR 105 times.42 Aside from this 
obligation, presidents tend to ignore the WPR, suggesting that ‘by and large, the WPR serves 
little purpose other than as a mechanism to force the president to report to Congress on his 
intentions to use force, or that he had already done so.’43  
On 13th December 2018, the Senate invoked the WPR for the very first time when it passed a 
resolution calling for an end to U.S. military aid to the Saudi-led coalition fighting in the 
conflict in Yemen. As was expected, this vote was largely symbolic – despite passing through 
both houses of Congress with bipartisan support, President Trump vetoed the joint resolution 
in April 2019.44 The president also vetoed a further attempt to introduce an Iran War Powers 
resolution in May 2020.45   
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The executive branch now claims a wide range of powers related to war-making, and to the 
interpretation of relevant international law, with contentious action in the area of the use of 
force consistently supported by those legal opinions drafted by the White House’s Office of 
Legal Counsel (OLC); as Arzich notes, the OLC presents its client – namely, the president – 
with ‘the best view of the law’ to suit the political purposes of the executive of which it is 
part’46 essentially acting as the ‘keeper of the presidential fig-leaf’.47 
Recent history is replete with executive branch assertions of unilateral presidential power in 
the area of war and the use of force. While Congress ultimately passed both the 2001 and 2002 
AUMFs at the request of the Bush administration, Bush’s legal counsel had nonetheless argued 
that it was ‘beyond question’ that the president had the ‘plenary constitutional power’ to ‘take 
such actions as he deemed necessary and appropriate to respond to the terrorist attacks upon 
the United States on September 11, 2001’, contending that neither the WPR, nor the 2001 
AUMF, ‘can place any limits on the President's determinations as to any terrorist threat, the 
amount of military force to be used in response, or the method, timing, and nature of the 
response’, concluding that  under the U.S. Constitution, such decisions ‘are for the President 
alone to make.’48  
In 2011, President Obama commenced military action in Libya absent the permission of 
Congress, with the OLC arguing that ‘[T]he President had the constitutional authority to direct 
the use of military force in Libya because he could reasonably determine that such use of force 
was in the national interest. Prior congressional approval was not constitutionally required to 
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use military force in the limited operations under consideration.’49 This same OLC memo 
further notes that, as earlier opinions of the OLC have demonstrated: 
‘[T]he President also holds “the implicit advantage . . . over the legislature under our 
constitutional scheme in situations calling for immediate action,” given that imminent 
national security threats and rapidly evolving military and diplomatic circumstances 
may require a swift response by the United States without the opportunity for 
congressional deliberation and action.’50  
In 2014, President Obama justified strikes against ISIS in Iraq as ‘pursuant to my constitutional 
authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive.’51 
Later, his administration argued also had to authority to carry out these strikes under the 2001 
AUMF, adding that while President Obama would ‘welcome Congressional action to support 
the Administration’s efforts against ISIL’, it was not their assessment that any new 
authorization was required.52  
President Trump’s assassination of Soleimani in January 2020, and his unauthorised strikes on 
Syria in both 2017 and 2018, are further examples of the broad remit assumed by the executive 
branch in the area of the use of force, with Congress seemingly powerless to halt military 
action.   
Ingber argues that international law itself is regularly invoked as an enabling force within the 
U.S. domestic legal system, where the U.S. executive uses international law to: 
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‘support expansive interpretations of statutory or constitutional grants of authority; to 
narrow statutory or constitutional prohibitions on executive action…; and to justify the 
displacement of the ordinary operation of domestic legal rules, at times with the effect 
of exchanging the ordinary domestic legal architecture for a more permissive 
framework based in international law.’53 
This empowerment phenomenon not only ‘facilitates the Executive’s aggrandizement of its 
own authority; at times it affirmatively induces it to do so.’54 Ingber’s examination of 
presidential referencing of international law to expand executive power, and as a ‘limiting 
principle’ in the area of the 2001 AUMF and targeted killing, are particularly relevant.55 In 
both cases, international law was used to provide legitimacy for executive branch action. It was 
then used to assert the Executive’s ‘wartime authority to act, at a minimum, to the limits of 
international law.’56 The result of this empowerment phenomenon has been to create an 
‘executive-inferred exception’ to domestic constraints, ‘shaped by an international law 
standard that the Executive defines.’57 Consequently, if an administration interprets 
international law in a permissive rather than a limiting fashion, as was the case with the Trump 
administration’s assassination of Soleimani, then the executive is also likely to take a similar 
approach in interpreting its war powers.58  
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The accumulation of war-making powers in the executive branch is a matter of concern for the 
international law on the use of force, as decisions taken by U.S. presidents to use armed force 
abroad against states and non-state actors directly implicate this law. As the exercise of the 
nation’s foreign affairs is a matter for the executive branch, the president has the power to 
interpret, and to inform the creation of, international law, and U.S. courts have granted 
‘substantial deference to the President’ on ‘both the substance and form’ of international law.59 
Given the increasing power of the executive branch over issues of war-making and uses of 
force, this is particularly concerning for the international law on the use of force.  
The president exercises significant control over the US interpretation and use of international 
law, without any systemic regulatory or judicial oversight ‘to guide or review the exercise of 
presidential discretion in this context.’60 Presidents ‘have come to dominate the creation, 
alteration, and termination of international law for the United States’,61 as has been 
demonstrated, for example, by President Trump’s unilateral decision to remove the United 
States from the Iran nuclear deal.62 ‘However limited the President’s domestic law-making 
authority may be’, writes Weisburd, ‘he clearly has considerable authority to create legal 
effects in the international context.’63 This presidential control is of particular concern in the 
area of customary international law, where the ‘vast majority’ of relevant U.S. governmental 
practice for customary international law is executive branch practice,64 and where ‘the 
President almost always decides the U.S. view on CIL… and is able to affect CIL both through 
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affirmative actions and statements and through decisions about whether to acquiesce in the 
practices and statements of other nations.’65 Weisburd notes that ‘…to the extent the United 
States participates in the formation of customary international law, it does so largely through 
the President’s acts.’66 The U.S. Supreme Court’s Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino 
decision noted: 
‘When articulating principles of international law in its relations with other states, the 
Executive Branch speaks not only as an interpreter of generally accepted and traditional 
rules, as would the courts, but also as an advocate of standards it believes desirable for 
the community of nations and protective of national concerns.’67 
This is not to say, of course, that enhanced or increased Congressional involvement with U.S. 
war powers and presidential decision-making on the use of force would necessarily make any 
such uses of force more compliant with existing international customary or treaty law on the 
use of force, but rather that, without any significant Congressional involvement in war-making 
decisions, presidential decisions to use force, and the accompanying interpretation of the 
relevant law, acquire even more importance. Furthermore, ‘almost all courts have held that the 
president and other high-level executive officers (such as the Attorney General) have the 
domestic legal authority to violate CIL.’68  
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The expansion of executive branch war powers and its influence over the interpretation of 
international law cannot be explained away by congressional inaction or presidential whims 
alone.  One of the key elements that has led to the accretion of executive branch powers is the 
centrality of national security in U.S. political life.  
 
 
THE CENTRALITY OF NATIONAL SECURITY IN U.S. POLITICAL LIFE 
‘Security against foreign danger is one of the primitive objects of civil society. It is an avowed 
and essential object of the American Union.’69 
Security is one of the overarching and primary concerns in U.S. national and political life. As 
Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz puts it, ‘[T]he United States has been at war every day since its 
founding, often covertly and often in several parts of the world at once.’70 A national 
preoccupation with matters of war and security was in evidence during the creation of the U.S. 
Constitution, and can be traced even further back in history than this.71 The early colonists and 
their communities perpetuated and experienced extreme violence, and ‘the likelihood of violent 
consequences was never far from their minds.’72 For example, there were striking parallels 
between the earlier occupation of Ireland and the occupation of North America,73 and for 
approximately a century, from 1650 to about 1750, ‘the English colonists in North America 
 
69 Federalist No. 4. Available at: https://www.congress.gov/resources/display/content/The+Federalist+Papers. 
70 Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz,‘What White Supremacists Know’, 20 November 2018, available at: 
http://bostonreview.net/race/roxanne-dunbar-ortiz-what-white-supremacists-know (20 October 2020). 
71 The ‘provision of security through restraint on violence’ was one of the Framers’ primary goals, with security 
an overarching issue at the Philadelphian Constitutional Convention in 1787. See: Daniel Deudney, Bounding 
Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village (Princeton, 2007) 163. 
72 John Shy, ‘The American Military Experience: History and Learning’ The Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History 1 (2) (1971), 205-228: 212. 
73 Natsu Taylor Saito, Meeting the Enemy: American Exceptionalism and International Law (New York, 2010) 
58. 
found themselves re-enacting on a small scale the horrors of Irish pacification and the Thirty 
Years War.’74  
American colonies experienced warfare ‘less in terms of protection, of somehow insulating 
society against external violence…than in terms of retribution, of retaliating against violence 
already committed.’75 This perception has stayed the course of American history. Appy 
describes the ‘single potent assumption’ upon which stories of American victimhood are based: 
‘our innocence and their treachery.’76 
Similarly, writing on the aftermath of 9/11, Sherry refers to ‘a belief that had long undergirded 
America’s militarization’:  
‘whatever military system it had, its leaders presented it as forced on them by 
enemies—not America’s choice, not America’s doing, not done in the pursuit of power 
or in blind rage but in the interest of protection.’77 
 Since the beginning of the Cold War and the advent of a modern system of global capitalism 
dominated by the U.S., war-making in particular has helped to strengthen the centralised 
American state and the Executive Branch.78  
 Bacevich identifies four premises that have steered U.S. military policy since the end of the 
Cold War, which did not, as might have been expected, result in demobilisation: ‘…a broad (if 
unratified) consensus regarding the inherent desirability of military power; a commitment to 
maintaining U.S. global military supremacy in perpetuity; and support for maximising the 
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utility of U.S. military might by pursuing an ambitious, activist agenda’, as well as the 
maintenance of the international order, ‘thereby enabling the processes of globalization to 
continue and the American people to reap its rewards.’79 Coupled with ‘a fundamental self-
confidence in the ability to fight’,80 this contributes to what Young identified as a conviction: 
‘…that American power is such that it must prevail in any situation in which it has 
declared an interest; that the only obstacle to its triumph is the lack of determination to 
use that power.’81 
This imagined national identity, strongly informed by a belief in valorous war-making for the 
furthering of ‘fundamental freedoms’, combined with the militarisation of U.S. society and the 
United States’ approach to military security, has had a profound impact on America’s 
relationship with its domestic war powers and international law. Calls from successive U.S. 
presidents advocating for the complete eradication of terrorism and terrorist threats against the 
U.S., for example, invoke an absolutist approach to national security that is unlikely to be 
constrained by international law. ‘State identity shapes states interests which in turn shape 
policy over time’, and the tensions inherent in the founding myths of the U.S. – that of being 
an exceptional state which nonetheless embodies ‘universal’ values and therefore must be 
protected – come to the fore in the country’s relationship with its executive branch and with 
international law.82 Where international law impedes or frustrates U.S. action, the U.S. tends 
to either ignore it and act anyway, as in the case of President Trump’s strikes in Syria against 
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the Syrian government, or in the assassination of Soleimani; or attempts to reconcile its 
unlawful positions with international law through the use of legalistic language, á la the 
targeted killing programme.83 
This equivocal relationship with international law has been in evidence since the formal 
founding of the United States. The ‘founding fathers’ attempted to secure the United States 
from external threats ‘by gaining recognition from the European powers of its independence 
and rights under international law.’84 As such, ‘the early American Republic embraced…the 
law of nations as a means of consolidating the sovereignty of its people and securing its place 
among an international society of sovereign states.’85 It was also a strong supporter of the 
institutions of international society, as they afforded the U.S. ‘some relief from European 
predation.’86 However, in invoking the law of nations, the ‘founding fathers’ were also 
immediately coming into conflict with that law. At that time, there was no right of self-
determination under international law and colonies did not have a right to rebel, and it was 
therefore not possible to base their claims for independence in legal terms.87  
‘[T]he international law they invoked…explicitly privileged the rights of colonizing 
powers over Indigenous peoples, and in asserting a legal right to rebel under these 
conditions the colonial leaders certainly were not prepared to recognize a similar right 
of American Indians to self-determination.’88 
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Notably, one of the grounds on which the revolutionaries claimed a right of self-determination 
was by proffering the accusation that the British monarch’s actions ‘were leaving them 
unprotected against “the merciless Indian Savages whose known rule of warfare, is an 
undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes, and conditions.” ’89 The United States, then, has 
been creating exceptions to the application of international law to itself on the grounds of 
security since the state’s creation.  
Attempting to inflict lawfulness through violence has been a characteristic of colonialism 
throughout its history. Violence, after all, is integral to the process of colonial accumulation. 
That the violence of U.S. military engagements and operations around the world today often 
takes place under the guise of upholding or promoting the international rule of law does not 
lessen its neo-colonial qualities. The U.S. often achieves foreign and defence policy goals while 
remaining observant of relevant international legal rules. Other actions, such as the targeted 
killing programme, decided within the executive branch of U.S. government and justified in 
the name of necessity and self-defence, and which go far beyond what the law sanctions, are 
available to the U.S. because these actions take place outside the ‘west’ or the ‘Global North’. 
An ahistoricism typical of imperialism also accompanies such actions; consider, for example, 
President Trump’s statement on his administration’s strikes on Syria in April 2018, in response 
to alleged chemical weapons use by pro-Assad forces. Trump deemed the Middle East a 
‘troubled place’, stating that the U.S. will ‘try to make it better’ – failing to acknowledge how 
U.S. actions have contributed to making the Middle East the ‘troubled place’ it is today.90 
In practice, the imperial character of U.S. international legal interpretation and defence policy 
has changed very little between administrations. Whether a U.S. president is a Democrat or a 
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Republican has mattered little in terms of how the U.S. approaches and practices defence 
policy, such is the level of militarisation in U.S. society, and the continued bipartisan support 
for U.S. military hegemony. There is no other state in the current international system that can 
more successfully repel aggression, and no other state has proven more capable at organising 
for what it deems ‘self-defence’. The expansion of executive branch war powers, and the 
president’s unchallenged authority in decisions on the use of force and international law 
interpretation, allow for prompt uses of force in situations which presidents regard as politically 
expedient or advantageous to U.S. interests, whether or not U.S. national security is actually 
under threat. 
CONCLUSION 
‘The accretion of central power in America has occurred most easily during wars’, wrote Porter 
in 1994.91 Now in a near-permanent state of war, executive branch war powers appear almost 
unlimited. The accretion of executive power cannot be considered at a remove from the society 
in which the US government operates: US political elites’ obsession with war and security, so 
effectively tied up with US national identity, has been a primary factor in the expansion of this 
power. Coupled with the remove at which the majority of US citizens experience armed 
conflict – that is to say, not at all – presidents have been able to accrue more and more 
‘flexibility’ in the area of war. As Dudziak notes, ‘a president’s ability, albeit imperfect, to 
shape the way Americans perceive war is a tremendously important aspect of presidential war 
power.’92  Successive US presidents have used both the debate over executive branch war 
powers and international law as smokescreens for unlawful uses of force. For instance, the U.S. 
was particularly vocal about the lawfulness of its actions under the international law on the 
recourse to force and the law of armed conflict under the Obama administration, going so far 
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as to assert that the administration held its drone strikes to higher targeting standards than those 
required by international humanitarian law.93 Where the Bush administration asserted the war 
on terror’s legitimacy to justify its internationally unlawful conduct to an electorate eager to 
see forceful action against those responsible for the 9/11 attacks, the Obama administration 
asserted its legality for an electorate jaded by war and aware of the scandals of Guantanamo 
Bay, torture and rendition. Meanwhile, the Trump administration shies away from clear 
statements and discussions about the international legality or the legitimacy of its conduct, with 
his primary constituency viewing international law as inherently ‘foreign’ and anti-American. 
Appeals to national security and presidential prerogative instead fulfil this role.  
An illustration of this can be found in the reports submitted to Congress under the WPR 
reporting requirements. The Obama administration submitted twenty-eight reports to Congress 
under the WPR, eight of which concerned hostilities or imminent hostilities. All eight 
referenced an international legal basis for the action in question. The Trump administration has 
submitted four reports to Congress, two of which relate to hostilities or imminent hostilities. 
None of the four reports provides an international law basis for the actions described in the 
reports.94  
Whether a U.S. president is a Democrat or a Republican matters little in terms of how 
presidents interpret executive war powers. Of the 105 reports made to Congress under the WPR 
since 1973, ninety-seven of these reports claim that, in each of these instances, the president’s 
domestic legal authority was derived from Article II of the Constitution alone. Sixty-five of 
these reports claiming such constitutional authority came from Democratic Party presidents.95 
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Primary differences are found instead in terms of how defence policies are framed and 
presented to either Democratic or Republican electorates, and whether and how this framing 
makes appeals to, or references, international law. Given the significant military power of the 
US, this has direct consequences for the international law on the use of force.  
Successive U.S. presidents have proclaimed the might of the U.S. military, and it is regularly 
exalted as being the most powerful in history. In a speech at Fort Drum, on August 13 2018, 
Trump stated that ‘…no enemy on Earth can match the strength, courage, and skill of the 
American Army and the American Armed Forces. Nobody is even close. They never will be.’96 
This extraordinary focus on the military might of the U.S. is matched by key figures in the 
Democratic Party. For example, Joe Biden’s presidential campaign website, under the heading 
‘defend our vital interests’, carries the following message: ‘As president, Biden will never 
hesitate to protect the American people, including when necessary, by using force. We have 
the strongest military in the world—and as president, Biden will ensure it stays that way.’97 
Assurances from both parties that neither will seek to diminish the standing of the US military 
demonstrates bipartisan consensus on one of the key issues in US domestic life relevant to the 
international law on the use of force. With ‘security’ at the political level tied to military 
necessity at the operational level, the US executive is encouraged to seek out figures, groups 
and territories that could potentially cause the state harm, or that could be perceived as 
threatening its interests, however broadly defined. And, as Neocleous observes, ‘the 
presupposition of permanent threat – to the warpower, to the social order, to human being – 
demands a constant reimagining of the myriad ways in which the threat might be realised.’98 
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This encourages the executive to address these potential threats through forceful and violent 
means. It can do so with great ease: the US continues to have a significant global military 
presence, with military bases in approximately 80 states,99 and an estimated 200,000100 troops 
in 170 countries.101  
Rather than looking only at what the end results of these ‘reimaginings’ are – at the thousands 
of deaths resulting from the targeted killing programme, for example, or at the steady erosion 
of international law principles such as non-intervention, and the attempted broadening of the 
right to use force in self-defence -  we also need to ask what interests these choices serve. 
Accepting attempts to make the decisions behind many of these issues look like questions of 
law, rather than questions of politics, hides the irreducibly political choices behind them. If war 
is the continuation of politics by other means, then we must examine the politics and the origins 
of these politics.102 In the United States, these politics are inextricably informed by and 
entwined with the country’s history of settler-colonialism and racial discrimination, and, since 
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